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The Political Ideas Underpinning Political Distrust: Analysing
Four Types of Anti-politics
Matthew Wood
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
ABSTRACT
Anti-politics has emerged as an important concept for analysing the
effects of distrust on liberal democratic politics. However, it is
unclear why democrats should trust individuals who distrust
politics to help them in renewing democracy. This article
addresses this puzzle by defining four types of anti-politics:
technocratic, elitist, populist and participatory. It then compares
the political thought of four democratic thinkers associated with
each type, to discern the extent to which they are ‘productive’ or
‘unproductive’ for representative democracy. The article argues
that participatory and technocratic types of anti-politics,
illustrated by the thought of Carole Pateman and, to a lesser
extent, Friedrich Hayek, are productive for representative
democracy because they prompt reflexivity in how representative
institutions work. By contrast, populist and elitist types of anti-
politics, illustrated by the thought of Ernesto Laclau and Joseph
Schumpeter, are less productive. The article concludes that
scholars need to carefully discern the logic underlying populist
and technocratic ‘solutions’ to our contemporary democratic crisis
because those solutions can themselves be advocated by ‘false
friends’ who are unreflexive about what should be considered





These normal allies of politics can occasionally forget themselves and act in a way that once
made Wellington say of his troops: ‘I don’t know if they scare the enemy, but by God – they
certainly scare me’ (Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics, p. 87)
Introduction
Anti-politics has become a popular concept for encompassing dynamics of distrust in
representative democracy (Wood, 2016). Recent decades have seen a substantial rise in
political distrust, with numerous scholars arguing this has led to a ‘crisis’ and existential
challenges to representative democracy, in a manner that has prompted the use of this
concept (for a review see Corbett, 2020). To what extent though, does distrust contribute
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to this crisis, and how should scholars interpret the necessary response? Political distrust
can emanate from and drive support for divergent ideological positions, from Donald
Trump to Bernie Sanders (Dyck, Pearson-Merkowitz, & Coates, 2018). The right level
of mistrust, on the other hand, can be seen as legitimate where scepticism about political
competence is warranted (Bertsou, 2019). Moreover, as studies of interpersonal trust
show, distrust can serve as a stimulant for re-engaging and renewing trustful relation-
ships, or for withdrawal and relationships stagnating (Ullmann-Margalit, 2004, p. 74).
In short, while most agree there is a ‘crisis’ of anti-politics, understanding the reasons
for political distrust, and evaluating proposed solutions to it, diverge significantly. This
article addresses two questions:
. Which theories of democracy that distrust mediated forms of representation, prompt
the reflexive use of unmediated forms of representation?
. Which theories of democracy that distrust mediated forms of representation do not
encourage the reflexive use of unmediated forms of representation?
Rather than intervene in already extensive debates about how to revitalize democracy
(see Dryzek et al., 2019) this article attempts to improve how we specify the problem. By
comparing specific ideas in western liberal democratic thought about representation that
express distrust towards the mediated way western liberal democracies practice represen-
tation, and propose alternative ways in which public preferences are best represented
through unmediated representation. In doing so, it aims to provide a roadmap for scho-
lars to assess whether those who profess distrust in representative democracy prompt
productive, critical reflection on how to improve the way representative institutions
work, or undermine them yet further.
To achieve the above aim, I map four belief systems from western democratic thought
that underpin, in important respects, four alternative groups of attitudes and preferences
for unmediated democratic representation, encapsulated by the anti-politics concept.
First, I argue thatmediated representation is a key element of the belief system underpin-
ning representative democratic politics, and a key object of critique for challenger belief
systems, notably populism and technocracy (Caramani, 2017). Second, I develop a
definition of anti-politics building on existing literature on technocracy and populism
as types of anti-politics (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020; Bickerton & Accetti, 2017; Clarke,
Jennings, Moss, & Stoker, 2018; König & Siewert, 2020). Third, I propose that the
extent to which they can be ‘trusted’ is the extent to which they encourage reflexivity,
that is, open and ongoing contestation. Fourth, I elaborate this definition into a map
of four types of anti-politics: technocratic, elitist, populist and participatory anti-politics.
I analyse how each type conceptualises democratic representation, and how this informs
distrust towards representative democracy within that stream of thought by comparing
four political thinkers: Joseph Schumpeter (elitist) and Friedrich Hayek (technocratic),
and Ernesto Laclau (populist) and Carole Pateman (participatory). These thinkers are
chosen because aspects of their thought illustrate arguments associated with (although
not entirely encompassing) ideas and attitudes in each type of anti-politics, which link
preferences for a particular kind of unmediated representation to an explicitly stated dis-
trust in mediated representation based either on ‘reason’ or ‘will’ (Caramani, 2017). I
argue that technocratic and participatory types of anti-politics, characterised by Hayek’s
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and Pateman’s thought, prompt reflexive engagement with the variety of sources of
‘expert reason’, and the diverse sources of popular ‘will’. Fifth, I conclude by arguing
that the extent to which we can trust those who distrust politics, relies on the extent
to which they reflexively acknowledge the plurality and contestability of expert knowl-
edge and popular will.
Mediated Representation as a Core Value of Representative Democracy
Liberal representative democracy has been viewed as increasingly ‘under threat’ from
growing distrust in politics and government, technocratic governance arrangements,
and populist politics of the radical right and left. However, notwithstanding explicit
insurrections against democratic government, such as the attempted violent insurrec-
tion instigated by supporters of Donald Trump at the United States Capitol Building
during the electoral college vote count on 6 January 2021, the drivers of democratic
‘backsliding’ have been conceptualized as more subtle. Certain key elements have
been viewed as under ‘critique’, not necessarily outright threat (Caramani, 2017).
This section posits the centrality of a particular concept in representative liberal
democratic politics that has been subject to sustained critique: mediated
representation.
In The Principles of Representative Government, Bernard Manin (1997) pinpoints a
crucial aspect of representative democracy. ‘From the second half of the twentieth
century’, Manin (1997, p. 194) argued, ‘political parties organizing the expression of
the electorate came to be viewed as a constitutive element of representative government’.
Political parties channel a relatively unified set of (predominantly class-based) identities
into relatively solidified policy platforms that had a claim tomediate those identities into
a coherent singular ‘party’ will. Concepts like ‘party democracy’ or ‘party government’
gave expression to this type of representation. They both, critically for our purposes,
rely on the idea of mediation as a central value of representative democracy. Mediated
representation, or what Mansbridge (2003) calls ‘promissory representation’, essentially
involves a principal-agent relationship where politicians are ‘delegated’ power by the
public, who monitor and then hold those agents responsible at elections. This relation-
ship ismediated in four senses: (1) ‘the source of legitimate power is separated from those
who exercise that power’; (2) ‘electoral representation identifies a space within which the
sovereignty of the people is identified with state power’; (3) ‘electoral mechanisms ensure
some kind of responsiveness to the people’, and (4) ‘the universal franchise endows elec-
toral representation with an important element of political equality’ (Urbinati &Warren,
2008, p. 389). Mediation, at heart, is the process through which politicians, through their
parties, connect with their sources of legitimacy (the sovereign electorate) by mobilising
them around a party platform, and negotiate within government to be responsive to the
electorate’s wishes. Through engaging with the system of parties and elections, citizens
exercise their rights to political equality.
Representative democracy came to be defined in the twentieth century by a particular
form of representation – mediated representation – in which political parties played not
only a functional role in providing stable and consistent forms of government, the idea of
mediation through parties and politicians also plays a critical normative role. Normative,
in the sense that political parties, politicians and the associated institutions and activities
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that sustain them – active civic engagement, campaigning and activism with and on
behalf of parties and those they represent, as well as party political bargaining and nego-
tiation within legislatures – are desirable because they ensure that mediation works effec-
tively. This is the very ‘stuff’ of politics that scholars have claimed is under threat by ‘anti-
politics’. It is the variety of ‘politics’ that Bernard Crick (1962) famously made the case for
in his In Defence of Politics. As we will see below, anti-politics refers to political belief
systems that reject this definition and practice of ‘politics’.
Defining Anti-politics
This article defines anti-politics as coherent sets of political attitudes and ideas (political
belief systems) containing preferences for unmediated mechanisms of democratic represen-
tation, informed by distrust in mediated democratic representation. This definition helps
to begin disentangling which types of anti-politics may be beneficial to representative
democracy, and which may be more problematic, due to their underlying argumentative
logic. In this sense, it furthers work on ‘anti-political’ logics and ideas recently developed
by Caramani (2017), Bickerton and Accetti (2021), Guasti and Bustikova (2020), and
others. These authors highlight the centrality of ‘technocracy’ and ‘populism’, and com-
binations of the two, as critical ‘challenger’ logics to traditional ideologies of ‘party gov-
ernment’. These ‘challengers’ propose to represent political preferences in an unmediated
way, in place of mediated representation. However, as scholars in this literature suggest,
the ‘challenge’ they pose is ambiguous and nuanced. This section provides a definition of
these challengers as political belief systems that can be characterized in terms of anti-poli-
tics so as to dissect the extent to which they prompt productive or unproductive demo-
cratic tendencies.
Unpacking this definition, the concept of anti-politics refers, at base, to a ‘political
belief system’. Political belief systems are relatively coherent sets of ideas and attitudes
that are coherent in that they ‘hang’ together in providing a ‘thin’ (that is, partial)
logical justification for particular ways of configuring power relationships within demo-
cratic institutions. A pivotal point to understand is that these belief systems are not non-
political (Wood, 2016). They are not neutral or noncommittal about how democratic
politics ought to function. Moreover, they are also not explicitly anti-democratic or
non-democratic. Rather, they propose alternative ways in which democratic representation
can and should function on the basis of a lack of confidence that mediated ‘party’ democ-
racy will achieve its core aims. They are hence anti-politics in the very specific sense of
conceptualising mediated representation in a normatively ‘negative’ way, and proposing
‘unmediated’ alternatives.
This ‘lack of confidence’ – or distrust – is the second key part of this article’s definition.
Individuals lack confidence in an institution or individual when they believe the outputs
of the institution or individual (that is, what they do in fact achieve as real-world actors)
do not, or cannot, match the expectations those institutions foster about their normative
goals and aims; as Bertsou (2019) defines political distrust, ‘A (does not) trust B to do C’.
Such distrust is fostered by institutions’ proclamations about their desired normative
goals, but is also influenced by the normative expectations individuals themselves have
about what those institutions should aim to achieve. In our case, distrust in mediated rep-
resentation is fostered by conflicting normative ideals about what the aims and goals of
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democracy should be. Table 1 divides these ‘sources of distrust in mediated represen-
tation’ into two aspects: ‘rational speculation’ and ‘will of the people’ (Caramani, 2017).
First, ‘rational speculation’ refers to the normative expectation that ‘the general inter-
est’ can be gleaned from combining different forms of evidence to generate expertise,
which in turn can inform fair decision-making processes to achieve valued goods (fair-
ness, justice, liberty and so on). This normative preference has its roots in theories of
democracy that set up ‘epistemic’ criteria for the success of democratic institutions
and is essentially technocratic in nature (Bhatia, 2018). Epistemic democracy claims
that ‘the best decision method is one that is both procedurally fair and is epistemically
valuable in approximating a procedure-independent standard’ (Mackie, 2009, p. 141).
In general, representative democratic institutions are viewed as preferable for achieving
these standards by theories of democracy that place epistemic criteria at their heart.
However, as Schwartzberg (2015, p. 199) notes, epistemic democratic arguments ‘may
have special appeal to those who believe that the justification of democracy lies in its pro-
tection of a set of core values’ but ‘who are anxious about the extent to which ordinary
citizens and their representatives will adequately protect them’ (emphasis added). This
anxiety exists in tension with, and can act as a source of distrust in, mediated represen-
tative democracy. From an epistemic perspective, it has been argued that mechanisms of
mediated representation – accountability mechanisms of elections most prominently –
do not incentivise good decision making. On the issue of tackling the climate crisis, scho-
lars have argued that elections are insufficient as mechanisms for ensuring credible long
term carbon emissions reduction strategies, essentially because politicians are forced to
make short term electoral compromises to win electoral competition, and cannot be
expected to have the sophisticated forms of knowledge required to adequately address
the problem (Jeffrey, 2018).
By contrast to the rational speculation critique, the ‘will of the people’ refers to the nor-
mative ideal that democratic decisions must reflect a unified and homogenous popular
demand, shorn of nuance or respect for diversity (Caramani, 2017). This normative cri-
terion is, of course, most common in the ideology of populism. Populism is defined as
an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that poli-
tics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people. (Mudde,
2004, p. 543)
Populists are explicitly distrustful of elites they accuse of being corrupted by the material
rewards of office, which allegedly put them in opposition to the interests of ‘the people’.
This sets up populism to be explicitly distrustful of mediated representation, because, for
populists, the people cannot ever entrust its morally pure singular will to the corrupted
Table 1. Anti-politics as political belief systems: sources of distrust and mechanisms for unmediated
representation.
Mechanism for unmediated representation
Source of distrust in mediated representation
‘Rational speculation’ ‘Will of the people’
Centralised Technocracy I Populism I
Distributed Technocracy II Populism II
Source: constructed by author.
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whims of elected elites. However, as we will see below, the ‘will of the people’ is a con-
tested notion, and those who propose alternative mechanisms of representation based
on an improved expression of the ‘popular will’ do not necessarily agree that the ‘will
of the people’ is as homogenous as populists do.
The third key aspect of my definition is the mechanism of ‘unmediated’ representation
proposed by these belief systems, as alternatives to parties and politicians. Here, it is
crucial to understand that mediated representation relies on a fine balance of power
between the ‘public’ and politicians. The public are assumed to hold ultimate power
through the mechanism of elections, but power must be held and exercised by those
who are best able to represent, or aggregate, their interests. The ‘principal-agent’ relation-
ship strikes a fine balance, therefore, between centralisation and distribution of power.
Politicians and parties are entrusted with a certain amount of power to make public
policy, while the wider public sphere exercises an oversight and accountability function
to hold the powerful responsible for policy outcomes.
Technocratic and populist alternatives propose to redistribute power in this relation-
ship via types of unmediated representation. However, it is ambiguous within these belief
systems how such unmediated representation should work. Both technocratic and popu-
list ideologies propose either to centralise or distribute decision making powers. Centra-
lised forms of unmediated representation include investment of power in a single leader
or party, who is viewed as being able to interpret and enact policies that are preferable to
the public. These forms of unmediated representation situate the state as a critical seat of
power, and seek to more directly represent a unified political force to embody the public
good at the heart of the state. This can either be on the basis of improving expert-led
reasoning or furthering the ‘will of the people’. As scholars of ‘techno-populism’ have
shown, both populist and technocratic parties have sought to centralise power within
a single leader – for example, Mario Monti, the temporarily appointed Italian technocrat
leader in 2011–2013, or Victor Orbán, the radical right-wing populist Hungarian leader.
By contrast, distributed forms of unmediated representation propose to disburse
decision making power away from politicians, towards the wider public, in the form
of communities, social organisations and businesses in the wider economy. Distributed
forms of unmediated representation do not necessarily ‘decentralise’ power altogether.
Rather, they ‘distibute’ it away from the state, looking for sources outside the state, in
the wider public and private spheres, to ‘authentically’ represent public preferences.
Again, both technocratic and populist alternatives do this. Populism can be seen in a
positive light for representative democracy, as a ‘corrective’ to liberal democracy’s ten-
dency towards elitism (Kaltwasser, 2012). Populism has been found empirically to encou-
rage electoral turnout and equality of participation, although this is mediated by ‘host’
ideology (Huber & Ruth, 2017). Technocratic arguments have been made for distributing
policy decisions to quasi-autonomous non-governmental agencies, independent aca-
demic and scientific committees and expert bodies, which operate at arm’s length
from the state (Wood, 2021).
In Table 1, this ambiguity is shown in each cell by technocracy I and II, and populism I
and II. While technocracy I and populism I advocate centralized mechanisms of unme-
diated representation on the basis of improving rational speculation and representing the
‘will of the people’, technocracy II and populism II both advocate distributing power away
from the state, adopting different forms of unmediated representation, either in the wider
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economy, or in local communities. Table 1 thus makes clear what is at stake when we
consider unmediated types of representation as alternatives to mediated representation,
and the basis on which these are advocated.
The Central Importance of Reflexivity
While mediated representation is a central normative feature of representative democ-
racy, reflexivity is a crucial factor that makes mediation work. Without the possibility
of being reflexive, democracy is but the imposition of a singular outcome on society.
In short, reflexivity – specifically defined as open and ongoing contestation – is a vital
benchmark against which to evaluate how ‘productive’ or ‘unproductive’ anti-politics
is for representative democracy. This article compares how productive or unproductive
anti-politics is for representative democracy using this criterion.
In The Priority of Democracy, Knight and Johnson argue that reflexivity is a core feature
of democratic politics. ‘Political argument’, they suggest, ‘requires relevant parties to
assert, defend, and revise their own views and to entertain, challenge, or accept those of
others’ (2014, p.135). Democratic politics of a distinctly representative variety requires
‘ongoing disagreement and conflict’, in which ‘arguments are exchanged under estab-
lished, fair conditions’. Reflexivity is a compliment to mediation, because the process of
mediation involves such argumentation, challenge and acceptance. It ‘structures disagree-
ment’, ensuring that political debate does not become too heated, but nor is it unnecess-
arily stifled. Reflexivity enables the processing and sorting of competing political ideas in a
way that respects the rights of the ‘losers’ of a democratic debate to contest the outcome in
future, as democracy ‘fosters still further disagreement’ (Knight and Johnson, 2014, p.136).
König and Siewert define reflexivity specifically as ‘open and ongoing contestability’
(2020, p. 4). Open and ongoing contestability ‘keeps up the future prospect to use
one’s political freedom and ensures the absence of enduring domination by any political
view’. Reflexivity is important because ‘citizens are enabled to effectively participate
within the existing institutional setting in ways that allow them to change existing pol-
icies, laws and institutions, without however eradicating the possibility of this reflexive
process itself’ (König & Siewert, 2020, p. 4). This connects with the ‘mediated’ element
of representative democracy because, in order to function properly, the party system
must be informed by a vibrant civil society that continually contests political issues. It
enables representative democracy to find a ‘middle ground’ of pluralistic respect for mul-
tiple legitimate views, and a balance between ‘responsiveness’ to the popular will, and
‘responsibility’ of political representatives. König and Siewert argue that such ongoing
contestability is made more problematic by technocratic and populist challenges,
because they ‘deform’ democratic debate by unreasonably prioritising either expert
knowledge or popular will.
This article takes reflexivity as a central tenet of representative democracy, which sup-
ports mediated representation. Mediation is enabled by reflexivity, because ongoing con-
testation and discussion of alternative policies and solutions to societal problems is the
very ‘stuff’ of mediated representative politics. It ‘greases the wheels’ of representation
and ‘reproduces’ representative democracy by stimulating how people (citizens, poli-
ticians, activists) engage with politics (ongoing political debate, negotiation and
contestation).
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Four Types of Anti-politics
To show how technocratic and populist forms of anti-politics contribute to or mitigate
against reflexivity, this article proposes to distinguish populist and technocratic belief
systems from two further, distinct, belief systems that emerge from similar arguments
about the importance of ‘reasoned speculation’ or the ‘will of the people’: these are
labelled ‘elitist’ and ‘participatory’ anti-politics. Table 2 hence maps four types of anti-
politics. It first summarises the model of representation they support (how ‘unmediated’
representation should work), locus of representation in this model (where and how rep-
resentation happens in the model), and the basis on which they distrust mediated rep-
resentation (assumptions about mediated representation). The primary move here is to
separate out technocratic and populist types of anti-politics into those that support
alternatives based on ‘reason’ or ‘will’, but based on a different interpretation of what
it means to prioritise ‘reason’ and ‘will’.
Below, I disaggregate these type of anti-politics by comparing the archetypal thought
of four political theorists: Joseph Schumpeter, Friedrich Hayek, Ernesto Laclau and
Carole Pateman. I choose each theorist as exemplary of each belief system in Table 2.
I chose these theorists not because they perfectly exemplify each type, nor because I
share their normative or partisan commitments, but because they make specific analytical
connections between unmediated representation and justifications for distrust in
mediated representation. Other scholars have chosen other theorists for each type, and
I do not claim these scholars are uniquely representative of each. Rather, they provide
for useful comparative analysis to identify how specific belief systems ought to be
judged as productive or unproductive by progressive scholars interested in improving
representative democracy.
Schumpeter and Hayek on ‘Enlightened Rule’ and ‘Expert Rule’
Technocracy is an idea of representation advocating the overt depoliticization of demo-
cratic decision making through delegation of political issues to a range of quasi-public
and private bodies (Wood, 2021; Bertsou & Caramani, 2020). It advocates the unme-
diated representation of policy options by experts in the policy making process.
Table 2. Types of anti-politics, their locus and model of representation, and basis of distrust in
mediated representation.
Type of anti-
politics Locus of representation Representative model
Basis of distrust in mediated
representation




based on their expertise
Politicians biased by electoral
cycle, leading to ‘slippery slope’
statism
Populist Direct democratic
mechanisms (‘will of the
people’)
Direct representation of ‘the will
of the people’ through
referendums/single party
Politicians a corrupt ‘elite’ that
must be overthrown through
party representing ‘the people’
Elitist Charismatic leader appealing
to a rational electorate
(‘enlightened rule’)
Charismatic leader is judged by
(otherwise) passive electorate
Politicians have privileged skillset
and the public lack skills for
engaging political issues
Participatory Participatory initiatives across
Society (‘popular will’)
Individuals participate actively in
wide variety of workplace
politics
Political efficacy must come from
bottom up
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However, while a preference for expertise has been well documented in the existing lit-
erature, little has been done to tease out the extent to which technocrats propose centra-
lised or distributed forms of unmediated representation as a replacement for mediated
representation. Such questions have important consequences for the reflexive or
unreflexive potential of technocracy. This section teases apart these differences by com-
paring two theorists: Joseph Schumpeter and Friedrich Hayek. While Schumpeter prefers
a centralised form of ‘technocratic’ representation, led by the enlightened wisdom of
charismatic politicians, Hayek advocates self-organising systems of experts in the
wider economy. I argue that these interpretations of expertise lead us to distinguish an
‘elitist’ Schumpeterian anti-politics based on unreflexive deference, from a ‘technocratic’
Hayekian anti-politics based on recognising distributed forms of expert knowledge.
Schumpeter’s Elitist anti-politics
Mediated representation requires public engagement with political parties and the trans-
mission and aggregation of political ideas and preferences through this medium (Cara-
mani, 2017). It relies on diverse entry points between civil society deliberation and formal
institutional spheres. ‘Elitist’ anti-politics rejects this notion of representation as over-
burdensome, and potentially dangerous, and is represented here by Joseph Schumpeter’s
idea of the heroic, careerist political leader. Elite politicians are viewed as the sole source
of enlightened rule. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter proposed to
redefine ‘democracy’, referring only to the barest bones of representation through elec-
tions. He first defines the ‘classical’ ideal of representation as a ‘democratic method’:
The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions
which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the elec-
tion of individuals who are to assemble to carry out its will. (Schumpeter, 1976/2003, p. 250)
Schumpeter critiques this conception by arguing that there is ‘no such thing’ as the
‘common good’ because ‘to different groups and individuals the common good is
bound to mean different things’ (Schumpeter, 1976/2003, p. 251). More generally,
however, Schumpeter is deeply sceptical about the capacity of individuals to undertake
the tasks of representative politics:
The typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters
the political field. He argues and analyses in a way which he would readily recognize as
infantile within the sphere of his real interests. (1976/2003, p. 262)
On this basis, Schumpeter argues not only that participation in politics is counter-pro-
ductive to determining the ‘common good’, but that it is counter-productive because
most citizens cannot be expected to engage in the complex and multifaceted thinking
democratic politics requires. The danger is, for Schumpeter, that ‘irrational prejudice
and impulse’ would win out over political judgement, with the result that ‘at critical junc-
tures, this may prove fatal to his nation’ (1976/2003, p. 262).
In response to this deeply distrustful view of democratic life, Schumpeter posits the
need for a constrained definition: ‘the democratic method is that institutional arrange-
ment for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (1976/2003, p. 269).
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Here democratic representation is, as Schumpeter is adamant to insist, ‘a career’ for pol-
itical leaders, who are elected to serve on a periodic basis. This is necessarily so, because,
as Schumpeter argues, maintaining democratic representation is such a monumental
effort of human will, that it requires almost absolute passivity from citizens, who do
not mediate their views to their representatives. He posits two conditions in particular:
quality electoral candidates and a constrained sphere of decision making.
First, those who engage in politics, Schumpeter argues, must ‘be of sufficiently high
quality’, by which hemeans political leaders of the highest quality. To enable this, Schump-
eter suggest the need for ‘a social stratum … that takes to politics as a matter of course’
(1976/2003, p. 258). Schumpeter refers, in as many words, to a landed, property owning
class that has the economic backing and social standing to undertake the momentous
task of political leadership, which, for him, is constitutive of democratic representation.
Second, Schumpeter is not only sceptical about who can lead in a democracy, he is also
distrustful of extending democratic representation over a wide range of potential econ-
omic issues. Schumpeter’s discussion on this point is somewhat hazy, including a short
argument in favour of expert agencies. However, he does note with clarity that ‘no respon-
sible person can view with equanimity the consequences of extending the democratic
method, that is to say the sphere of ‘politics’, to all economic affairs’ (1976/2003, p. 266).
Rather than extending the realm of political deliberation beyond the state, or viewing
multiple groups as being able to exercise democratic agency, Schumpeter proposed
viewing representation in an essentially consumerist way. Since individuals can make
rational decisions within their own household expenditure, they may only be able to
do so to a limited extent in deciding who to vote for in an election to high office,
relying largely on consumer instincts for the candidate with the ‘best product’. The indi-
viduals who put themselves forward for office would be the extraordinary characters to
act as ‘leaders’, and sell their values to the public as ‘celebrities’ (Wood et al., 2016). Once
elected, there would be stark division of labour between the ‘entrepreneurs’ selected to
lead, and a relatively obedient public, who would follow. Politicians lead, and they are
re-evaluated on a periodic basis by electorates. Any extension of this model is both
unworkable and dangerous.
This conception of representation is inhibiting and non-mediated. For example,
Schumpeter implies that electorates should not seek to influence or engage their
leaders in between elections:
Control between elections, such as by imperative mandate or discretionary revocability
(recall), or by an outpouring of public opinion on an issue sufficient to change official’s
prior views, all of which [Schumpeter] would legally prohibit as contrary to the spirit of
the democratic method (Mackie, 2009, p. 144).
Where the demos are referred to, it is not in the form of a consenting citizenry, but as
passive subjects:
Democracy is portrayed by the image of a team of horses harnessed to a carriage driven by
an aristocrat with a whip. A second aristocrat might seize the team from the first one, if he is
stronger. Nothing more. (Mackie, 2009, p. 145)
Schumpeter’s conception of democratic representation, therefore, hinges on a passive
and obedient citizenry who do not push for democracy to be extended into the private
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realm. Moreover, they accept (indeed, laud) political leadership from the aristocratic
class, who are assumed to have superior knowledge necessary to govern. Schumpeter’s
theory influenced the growth of rational choice theories of democracy that have been cri-
ticised for creating public distrust of politicians and political parties, due to the emphasis
placed on marketing, consumerism and individualism (Hay, 2007). Citizens are ‘the
bearers of preferences that are to be aggregated into a social utility function which the
political system is expected to maximize’ (Palumbo, 2010, p. 327).
Hayek’s technocratic anti-politics
Friedrich Hayek’s work provides a distinct angle of critique to Schumpeter’s elitist argu-
ment. Hayek did not believe the state could design interventions in society from the top
down, relying on a small number of elite ‘experts’ (Hayek 1944/2014). In this respect,
Hayek was highly distrustful of the technocratic politics of Keynesian economists who
believed in scientifically driven state planning as a complement to liberal democracy.
However, he does not reject the importance of expertise out of hand. Instead, Hayek
believed that if decision making power was distributed away from the state, those
decisions would adequately represent the (self-interested) preferences of individual econ-
omic actors. Hayek’s relevance as a theorist of technocracy is highlighted by Alfred
Moore:
While Hayek powerfully rejected the aspiration to prediction and control of complex social
systems that he thought underpinned any attempt at economic planning, he regarded his
own approach as one grounded firmly in the science of complex systems (Moore, 2021,
p. 17 footnote 3, italics added).
Hayek argued for a type of ‘self-organising’ economic system where actors’ ‘tacit’ knowl-
edge, applied in their private interactions, would effectively represent their preferences in
a complex and evolving marketplace, in place of a top down form of state administration
he deeply distrusted. This connection is made in Hayek’s work via the concept of spon-
taneous order. To understand spontaneous order, it is necessary to understand Hayek’s
view of the necessary distinction between a state and market-based political order.
There is no other possibility than either the order governed by the impersonal discipline of the
market or that directed by the will of a few individuals (Hayek 1944/2014, p.205, italics
added).
This stark distinction is underpinned by an idea of the essential source of political auth-
ority, which, for Hayek, must come either from a single point – the state – or from the
market where social order emerges from ‘the undersigned novelties that constantly
emerge in the process of adaptation’ (Hayek, 1960/2006, p. 30). ‘Markets’, as Hayek
sees them, are essentially natural, self-ordering mechanisms – ‘the spontaneous forces
of growth’ (Hayek, 1960/2006, p. 34). Crucially, Hayek insists that the market creates
order in an organic way that protects essential liberties, because of the principles of
what he calls ‘organization’:
The argument for liberty is not an argument against organization … Every organization is
based on given knowledge; organization means commitment to a particular aim and to par-
ticular methods. (1960/2006, pp. 33–34)
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Hence, while Hayek does not use the concept directly, expertise – or what he calls ‘ration-
ality’ – is crucial to advancing society: ‘for advance to take place, the social process from
which the growth of reason emerges must remain free from its control’ (Hayek, 1960/
2006, p. 34). From here, Hayek justified rule by ‘the market’ on the basis that it creates
social organisation through rationality.
Hayek’s vision informs a version of representation – spontaneous order – that is reso-
lutely anti-statist, in contrast to state-based conceptions of technocracy. Spontaneous
order is representative in a broader sense, being the source of what Hayek called
‘opinion’ or ‘a set of diffused beliefs about what is right which reflects unconscious
social norms’ (Bellamy, 1994, p. 422). Hayek was against centralised expert governance,
which he says is inevitably dictatorial (Bellamy, 1994, p. 423). Indeed, as Andrew Gamble
observes, ‘If anything, Hayek had a stronger commitment to democracy than did [John
Maynard] Keynes’ (Gamble, 1996, p. 157). However, as Alfred Moore (2016, p. 57)
argues, ‘Hayek’s suspicion of any sort of explicit communication oriented to the coordi-
nation of collective action leads him, ironically, to invoke a sort of second-order technoc-
racy’. In short, Hayek’s argument against top-down authoritarianism leads to him
justifying rule by ‘communities’ of individuals who represent knowledge within their
specific fields. His discussion of the nature of ‘knowledge’ in The Constitution of
Liberty clarifies this:
Not all the knowledge of the ever changing particular facts that man continually uses lends
itself to organization or systematic exposition; much of it exists only dispersed among
countless individuals. The same applies to that important part of expert knowledge which
is not substantive knowledge but merely knowledge of where and how to find the needed
information. (1960/2006, p. 24)
As such, as Greenwood (2010, p. 772) argues, Hayek’s ‘proposals for a market-driven
model of political economy hinge upon the assignment of a significant role to judicial
and legal experts in the non-market, legislative sphere’. Hayek makes the case for legal
experts to ensure the independence of different spheres of economic life from state
direction.
Focusing on Hayek is useful because he fleshes out a conception of technocratic rep-
resentation based on expertise, but distrustful of the liberal democratic state and its
associated processes of interest mediation. Hayek’s scepticism about the finality of scien-
tific evidence has informed potentially progressive ideas about democracy and the plur-
ality of knowledge. Scholars of ‘epistemic democracy’ have made use of Hayek’s
arguments to suggest he provides tacit support for post-positivist conceptions of exper-
tise where the variety of forms of expert knowledge is respected. Ober (2008), for
example, claims that Hayek supports a notion of ‘knowledge in action’ while other epis-
temic democrats note his assumption that ‘information is both held and constantly
updated by individuals on a … local basis as they respond to the ever-changing world
around them’ (Gunn, 2014, p. 66). In Democratic Reason, Landemore (2017, p. 86)
even argues Hayek offers ‘fascinating insights’ into ‘the preconditions for the emergence
of truth within the public sphere’, whilst simultaneously being (ultimately) incompatible
with ‘the rule of the many’.
Landemore’s insight that Hayek’s thought is ultimately ‘incompatible’ with ‘rule by the
many’ is crucial for understanding technocratic anti-politics. In contrast to Keynes’
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disciples who advocated technocratic state intervention with government convening
committees of scientific experts, a form of technocratic politics, Hayek promotes a
specific version of technocratic anti-politics because he warns against state intervention
and voices distrust in politicians and legislatures, on the basis that they do not and cannot
fully represent the diversity of forms of technical knowledge within the economy.
Contrasting Schumpeter and Hayek enables us to see where arguments about
‘reasoned speculation’ prompt reflexivity, or entrench hierarchical thinking, in their
interaction with representative democracy. Schumpeter is concerned about the limits
of representation and the potential for bad decision making. However, unlike Hayek,
Schumpeter does favour an empowered bureaucratic state, arguing that ‘democratic gov-
ernment in modern industrial society must be able to command … it is not enough that
the bureaucracy should be efficient in current administration and competent to give
advice. It must be strong enough to guide’ (1976/2003, p. 260). This goes directly
against Hayek’s vision of a decentralised polity of self-organising communities; indeed,
Schumpeter’s ‘conclusions are anathema to Hayek with his commitment to individual
liberty’ (Greenwood, 2010, p. 781)
Hence, both Schumpeter and Hayek are distrustful of mediated party representation
(they are both ‘anti-politics’ in this sense), and both argue for unmediated forms of rep-
resentation to improve ‘reasoned speculation’. However, while Schumpeter argues for
rule by enlightened political leaders, Hayek argues for self-organising economic
systems based on individual sources of expert knowledge. This point of tension is a
key moment of divergence within different modes of technocratic thought, and are
importantly distinct in how reflexive they are in their consideration of what unmediated
forms of representation might be preferable to mediated forms.
Laclau and Pateman on the ‘Will of the people’
Populist anti-politics is similar to the technocratic type to the extent that it poses a
‘critique’ of mediated representation (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017). As Caramani
(2017, p. 60) argues, ‘Populism and technocracy see themselves as antipolitics and,
more specifically, antiparty’. By ‘antiparty’, Caramani means ‘anti’ the aggregation
of societal interests via party politics, a key institutional feature of mediated represen-
tation. For populists, party ‘elites’ not only have insufficient access to relevant infor-
mation and expert views (as technocratic anti-politics argues), but because they
corruptly counteract the ‘true’ democratic will. However, various scholars have high-
lighted how populism is of ‘ambiguous’ value within representative democracy. Popu-
lism has been seen as a ‘double edged sword’ for both critiquing and correcting flaws
in representative democracy, but also as a potential ‘threat’ (Canovan, 1999; see
Vergara, 2020 for an extended discussion). Here, I analyse the reflexive and non-
reflexive sides of populism by comparing different interpretations of the ‘will of the
people’ in democratic thought, comparing Laclau’s radical leftist populism and Pate-
man’s participatory democracy. I argue that we ought to separate out Laclau’s more
directly populist form of anti-politics, with its strategically inflexible interpretation
of the ‘will of the people’, from a distinct form of ‘participatory anti-politics’ that
shares populist distrust of mediated representation, but interprets the popular will
in a more pluralist and reflexive manner.
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Laclau’s Populist anti-politics
Ernesto Laclau’s (2005) conception of populism provides the most explicit formulation of
a populist idea of representation, which informs his distrust of representative democracy.
With co-author Chantal Mouffe, Laclau has made the case for a radically democratic
populist vision that seeks to use the channels and processes provided by representative
democracy to undermine corrupt ‘elites’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). In On Populist
Reason Laclau defines certain ‘preconditions’ for the rise of populism, namely ‘the for-
mation of an … antagonistic frontier separating ‘the people’ from power’ and ‘an equiv-
alential articulation of demands making the emergence of ‘the people’ possible’ (Laclau,
2005, p. 74). There is ‘a part which identifies itself with the whole’ and uses strategic
entry-points into the representative democratic system (for example political parties)
as a way of colonising the system by exposing and exploiting its institutional biases.
Crucially, Laclau (2005, p. 167) argues that populism promotes ‘forms of democracy
outside the liberal symbolic framework’. As Canovan (1999, p. 2) notes, ‘Many [popu-
lists] favour ‘direct democracy’ – political decision making by referendum and popular
initiative. Their professed aim is to cash in democracy’s promise of power to the
people.’ Referendums and similar ‘democratic innovations’ are, however, advocated
not as a supplement to mediated representation, but as a corrective against liberalism.
Liberalism requires ‘neutral’ institutions – like courts, expert agencies and a neutral
civil service – that are anathema to populists. Populists may advocate economic liberal-
ism (Weyland, 1999), but simultaneously seek to undermine liberal political institutions.
They do so from a position they insist is democratic. This is what sets populism up to
exacerbate political distrust – both the support for democracy and simultaneous distrust
for its particular mediated form. This distrust means that populism ‘can be something
that both accompanies democracy and haunts it’ (Arditi, 2004, p. 141).
In practice, populist distrust of mediated representation is manifested through a series
of stylistic moves in how populist parties and leaders articulate the need for represen-
tation of the ‘will of the people’, homogenously conceived. Arditi (2010, p. 489) sets
out this process as follows:
(1) ‘When a series of social demands cannot be absorbed differentially by institutional
channels, they become;
(2) unsatisfied demands that enter into a relationship of solidarity or equivalence with
one another and;
(3) crystallize around common symbols that;
(4) can be capitalised by leaders who interpellate the frustrated masses and thus begin to
incarnate a process of popular identification that;
(5) constructs ‘the people’ as a collective actor to confront the existing regime with the
purpose of;
(6) demanding regime change.’
Distrust here arises through the gap that develops between what the public expect
from party representation, and what it delivers (Flinders, 2012). Since the people’s
demands cannot be universally represented by a form of ‘politics’ requiring compromise,
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they are left with no choice but to band together and develop a politicizing campaign, led
by a single leader who ‘interpolates’ their demands and ‘constructs’ a singular solution.
For Laclau, there cannot be a way of balancing or mediating between the interests of
multiple parties or sections of society. Laclau implies this would be submitting to a ‘depo-
liticised’ version of democracy, which he equates with technocracy (Bickerton and
Accetti, 2017, p.193). Instead, he argues that ‘an assemblage of heterogeneous elements
kept equivalentially together only by a name is … necessarily a singularity’ (Laclau,
2005, p. 100, italics added). Where groups excluded from society make claims for equal-
ity, they must, Laclau argues, necessarily reject the legitimacy of competing group
demands. ‘Thus’, as Bickerton and Accetti (2017, p. 194) argue, Laclau’s version of popu-
lism serves to ‘undermine the legitimacy of political opposition as such, because in the
face of a hegemonic representation of the ‘people’, any form of political opposition or
resistance is bound to be perceived as illegitimate’.
Populist anti-politics as expressed in Laclau’s work distrusts balanced competition for
governing office, whilst simultaneously seeking to impose an alternative – ‘direct’ – vision
of representation, namely, the unified implementation of the ‘will of the people’ through
populist party leaders and referendums. Scholars note how this alternative conception of
representation informs distrustful public attitudes. Norris, Garnett, and Grömping
(2020, p. 106), for example, show in their study of the 2016 American presidential elec-
tion, that ‘distrust in elections is rooted in deep-seated psychological orientations among
those favouring conspiratorialist beliefs and populist values’. Preferences for direct
democratic mechanisms including referendums have been found to correlate with dis-
trust in representative government (Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2007). Again, it is impor-
tant to distinguish between populist anti-politics as a belief system, and ‘populism’ as a
‘thin ideology’. Populist anti-politics as a conception of unmediated representation
informing, and informed by, political distrust can be seen in the internal ideas and
beliefs of those who use populist forms of rhetoric and sloganeering, which is part of
populism but not its entirety. Populism as a ‘thin’ ideology professed by political
parties has not been found to correlate with distrust among voters (Rooduijn, 2019). It
is important therefore, when assessing populist anti-politics as a ‘friend’ or ‘foe’ of repre-
sentative democracy, to distinguish its conception of unmediated representation, as seen
in Laclau’s thought, against the multifaceted components of populism more generally.
Pateman’s participatory anti-politics
Carole Pateman’s work is useful for teasing out elements of populist thought that can
enable reflexivity, without resorting to a single, centralised leadership model. In this
regard, I propose to distinguish a distinct type of participatory anti-politics that highlights
the specific challenge posed by participatory democracy, with similarities to populism,
but a more reflexive interpretation of the ‘popular will’.
Pateman’s theory of participatory democracy came about through her essential dis-
content that ‘It is claimed that if we are to talk realistically about democracy then we
must accept that the ordinary citizen is unlikely to become more interested or active
in political affairs than he is at present’ (Pateman, 1971, p. 292). In Participation and
Democratic Theory, Pateman argued that liberal democratic theory tended to advocate
participation within civic institutions, and especially in elections, but fails to extend
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this logic to other parts of society, where what she called ‘political efficacy’ is developed.
Critiquing the work of Almond and Verba (1963) on political culture, she argues that
it is not just the impact of the national political structure that helps ‘shape’ the political
culture, but authority structures, that is, political structures on a wide definition of the
term ‘political’, in various social spheres; the impact of the authority structure of the work-
place being particularly important. (1971, p. 303)
Pateman sets her theory up in the tradition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as a way of
explaining how to improve political culture through participation:
The existence of representative institutions at the national level is not sufficient for democ-
racy … for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a participatory society to exist, i.e. a
society where all political systems have been democratized. (Pateman, 1970, pp. 42–43)
While Pateman argues that participation in institutions throughout society can aid the
functioning of representative legislatures, it is far from the only reason why participation
is necessary:
In the participatory theory ‘participation’ refers to (equal) participation in the making of
decisions, and ‘political equality’ refers to equality of power in determining the outcome
of decisions. (Pateman, 1970, p. 43)
Unlike in liberal theory, participation does not serve the primary purpose of enabling
the ‘right’ decisions to be made, but rather, it fulfils the function of ‘self-education’:
One might characterize the participatory model as one where maximum input (partici-
pation) is required and where output includes not just policies (decisions) but also the devel-
opment of the social and political capacities of each individual. (Pateman, 1970, p. 43)
As such, participatory democratic theory views the representation of political views
and opinions as being necessary in multiple spheres of life – including, especially, indus-
try and the workplace. Engagement in particular workplace scenarios, especially those
where individuals have greater personal autonomy over their work, creates ‘feelings of
personal confidence and efficacy that underly the sense of political efficacy’ (Pateman,
1970, p. 51). Hence, Pateman argues for democratizing and encouraging equal citizen
participation in industrial workplaces, including car factory plants, textile mills and
other places of work, to improve psychological health, feelings of self-worth, and, as a
result, overall ‘political culture’.
Pateman’s original thesis was complementary to ‘classical’ theories of liberal democ-
racy, extending where and when political representation could happen, so as to enrich
‘national’ representative institutions. However, in later work she critiques the growth
of institutionalised democratic ‘innovations’ and forms of participatory governance,
arguing that they ‘fit very easily within existing authority structures, and citizens are
not participating, as a matter of right, in decisions about their city’s or town’s regular
budget. Most of the innovations fall far short of participatory democracy’ (Pateman,
2012, p. 14). Participatory democracy, she argues, is about challenging ‘authority struc-
tures’ and how they are organised, but ‘most of the [current] expansion of participation
does not disturb existing institutions’ (Pateman, 2012, p. 15). Here, her work shows dis-
trust of authority structures and institutions, rather than assimilation into their efficient
functioning. Participatory democrats may support participation enabling good political
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decision making at the level of state policy-making, but their concern is not always, or
even primarily, at that level. They may therefore be seen as promoting ‘anti-politics’ to
the extent that they reject settling for a traditional conception of representation
limited to mediation through the state, and propose radical critique that pushes represen-
tative institutions and state authorities to ambitiously meet many of the democratic ideals
those institutions and authorities often fail to meet.
Pateman’s thought is interesting here because it shows where a line of populist critique
of mediated representation diverges towards an advocacy of ‘bottom up’ forms of unme-
diated (authentic) representation through participation, as opposed to strategic support
for a single party or leader. In essence, Pateman follows Laclau’s line of reasoning on the
exclusionary nature of state-based decision making structures and the modes of mediated
representation imbued within them, but diverges in terms of the strategic choice to seek a
singular form of rhetorical commitment to a party, leader or expression of popular will.
Indeed, for Pateman, the ‘popular will’ must be conceptualized in a pluralist manner,
owing to the historic exclusion of women from the public sphere. She views the
expression of singular demands towards authority figures in the public sphere, a necess-
ary characteristic of Laclau’s radical democracy, as more problematic.
This view is illustrated in Pateman’s lambasting critique of William Riker’s presump-
tion that Rousseau, with whom she affiliates her own participatory position, was a ‘popu-
list’: ‘Radical democratic theory involves a quite different conception of the individual,
social life, and collective action from ‘populism”’ (Pateman, 1986, p. 40). Pateman uses
her critique of social choice theorists’ characterisation of participatory democratic
thought to develop a nuanced conception of the ‘will of the people’:
The general will presupposes that citizens act politically on the basis of a collectively self-
conscious understanding of the value of living in a democracy, and that they ‘will’ the pol-
icies necessary to maintain it. This is not to say that citizens always agree what the general will
is but, rather, that they understand their own political practice. (Pateman, 1986, p. 45, italics
added)
Hence, Pateman draws a firm line between her own, nuanced, conception of the ‘will
of the people’, and that of ‘populism’, which maintains the public will to be singular and
unitary.
The reflexive potential of Laclau’s populist anti-politics can also be critiqued when we
consider the relationship between populism and the radical nationalist right. Direct pol-
itical action aimed at colonising ‘elite’ institutions provides no ‘get out’ for those insti-
tutions to reflexively re-engage the public. To the extent that populist anti-politics
accommodates ‘reflexivity’, it is only that it forces politicians and governments to
respond, and the way they do so is likely to be more suppressive than productive, as
seen in contemporary radical right-wing populist governments (McKean, 2016). Scholars
have lamented Laclau and his followers’ lack of reflexivity in considering the meaning of
populism to challenge these forces:
On the one hand, they have been univocal in their advocacy for a left populism, mainly as a
vehicle for a radicalized democracy. On the other, their embrace of a formalist theory of
populism delays (or externalizes) any strong positioning as to what ‘modality’ of populism
is preferable (Boriello and Jäger, 2020, p.10)
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Comparing Laclau and Pateman, as with Hayek and Schumpeter, demonstrates where
the advocacy of unmediated forms of representation may facilitate ongoing contestation.
It is at the precise point that Pateman recognises the diversity of popular will, and its
expression in diverse bottom-up forms of representation in the workplace and house-
hold, that her distrust of mediated representation diverts to a consideration of forms
of authentic representation outside of the state. In this respect, she follows the thought
of Benjamin Barber’s (2003) Strong Democracy, and the agenda of deliberative democrats,
in considering a fuller agenda for democratising formal representative institutions, and
thereby ‘deepening democracy’. By contrast, Laclau follows other radical democrats,
most notably Jacques Rancière (2010), in confronting state institutions with a unified
oppositional will. This ‘choice’, from the perspective put forward in this article, refuses
the idea that mediated representation can ever be made to reconsider the popular will
because it relies on state institutions that are inherently repressive, owing to intersecting
class, gender and race inequalities, among others.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article has argued that distrust in a representative democracy is more productive for
representative democracy when such distrust is linked to and encourages ‘reflexivity’
about alternative forms of unmediated representation. It makes this argument by enga-
ging and disaggregating the concept of anti-politics. This concept can be used to tease out
the conditions under which distrust of politics can prompt the reinvigoration of repre-
sentative democracy because it refers to a distrust in mediated representation and advo-
cacy of alternative ‘unmediated’ forms of representation outside the state. The article
provides a conceptual dissection of the political thinking behind two sets of political
belief systems that scholars have recently identified as ‘anti-politics’: technocracy and
populism. Through dissecting the political thought of four thinkers, the article shows
the precise points at which technocratic and populist thinking diverges between either
advocating ‘reflexive’ or ‘non-reflexive’ responses to distrust in democracy, hence
leading to four types of anti-politics. Those points are where the thinkers in question con-
sider their own commitments to ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ rule according to expertise, or
their interpretation of the ‘will of the people’, and choose to either rely on a singular
(unreflexive) or a pluralistic (reflexive) interpretation. While unreflexive, singular
interpretations may be necessary when political leaders in a democracy refuse engage-
ment in considering democratic reform, or act in an authoritarian manner, they do
not provide a ‘productive’ approach to prompting or encouraging unmediated forms
of representation as a complement to mediated structures.
My argument is that Pateman and Hayek’s specific reasons for distrusting representa-
tive democracy can be viewed as encouraging reflexivity in the democratic system that
comes from a preference for distributed forms of unmediated representation. Schump-
eter and Laclau seek to essentially manipulate the system of mediated representation
to serve unmediated ends. By contrast, Pateman and Hayek have relatively little to say
about mediated political institutions, and instead propose methods for stimulating
engagement in wider society to offer reflective feedback into mediated institutions.
Hayek, of course, advocates the market as preferable for public knowledge and expertise
to be represented in the economy, whereas Pateman suggests participation among
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workers of all kinds to develop the kind of political efficacy that can be useful for rep-
resentation in the mediated political system. Pateman offers a far more extensive, enli-
vening vision of democracy and its potential if representative institutions can be
moved to engage effectively. Hayek, of course, is deeply sceptical that the state should
respond in this way. Both thinkers, however, start by distancing themselves from
mediated institutions to envisage ways of developing political and economic knowledge,
that are acknowledged weaknesses of centralised representative democratic institutions.
They essentially encourage reflexivity within liberal democratic systems through distrib-
uted forms of unmediated representation, sharing an acknowledgement of the plurality
of, in turn,forms of expert knowledge and popular preferences.
Laclau and Schumpeter, by contrast, pay little attention to wider public engagement
and its potential, instead of viewing mediated systems of representation as inherently
faulty elite projects with a singular remedy. For Laclau, the corruption of political and
economic elites is essentially irredeemable, while for Schumpeter the public cannot be
trusted to make rational, reasonable decisions about matters of public life. Their response
is not to distance themselves from those institutions’ faults to develop representative
qualities elsewhere, instead of seeking to suppress their faults by limiting the way in
which democratic representation can and does occur (Schumpeter) or manipulating
the mechanisms of mediated representation towards a political crusade against ‘elites’
(Laclau). Neither, therefore, seek to stimulate reflexivity within mediated representative
democracy. Contrasted with the ideas of participatory and technocratic anti-politics,
populist and elitist anti-politics do not offer easy ‘redemption’ for representative democ-
racy through unmediated representative forms, because they do not encourage outlets for
reflection and improvement in how representation works, instead of assuming unremit-
tingly rationally self-interested citizens and politicians (Schumpeter) or corrupt elites
(Laclau) require representation be squeezed into a singular outlet, either a charismatic,
aristocratic leader or a singular representative ‘of the people’.
Who, then, can we trust who distrusts politics? My answer is that this depends on
whether those who claim to distrust politics are reflexive in considering the diversity
of values associated with the concept they attach normative meaning to in the justifica-
tions they give for their distrust. This has implications for our understanding of the
impact of technocratic and populist types of anti-politics on democratic thinking and
practice. If you are reflexive in your consideration of who can and should be considered
an ‘expert’, your technocratic views prompt you to consider how to stimulate social and
economic activity through multiple sources of expertise. This was Hayek’s view on the
value of expertise and technical knowledge in the economy. If, on the other hand, you
consider expertise to be a unique, uncontestable and singular quality, your views are
closer to Schumpeter’s, and assume a singular, uncontestable wisdom of the leader,
which are not reflexive. Similarly, if you highlight the ‘will of the people’ as a key norma-
tive criterion of democracy, and yet fail to acknowledge the plurality of this ‘will’, then
this means your political response will be non-reflexive. Participatory and technocratic
anti-politics promote reflexivity, while elitist and populist anti-politics reject it.
In sum, as the quote from Bernard Crick at the start of this article suggests, those who
purport to renew democracy may do so with the best of intentions, but we need to watch
out in the struggle to revitalise democracy for ‘false friends’. These false friends refuse to
think reflexively about the concepts they use to expose representative democracy’s
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weaknesses. Mediated representation may well fall short in expressing the ‘will of the
people’ and integrating the best forms of expertise into decision making. However, the
alternatives are far from straightforward in themselves. Those who are distrustful of
mediated representation ought to acknowledge that the alternative concepts they value
– ‘expert knowledge’ and ‘the will of the people’ – are in themselves diverse and
contested.
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